Abstract. Deterministic public key encryption (D-PKE) provides an alternative to randomized public key encryption in various scenarios (e.g. search on encrypted data) where the latter exhibits inherent drawbacks. In CRYPTO'11, Brakerski and Segev formalized a framework for studying the security of deterministic public key encryption schemes with respect to auxiliary inputs. A trivial requirement is that the plaintext should not be efficiently recoverable from the auxiliary inputs. In this paper, we present an efficient deterministic public key encryption scheme in the auxiliary-input setting from lattices. The public key size, ciphertext size and ciphertext expansion factor are improved compared with the scheme proposed by Brakerski and Segev. Our scheme is also secure even in the multi-user setting where related messages may be encrypted under multiple public keys. In addition, the security of our scheme is based on the hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) problem which remains hard even for quantum algorithms. Furthermore, we consider deterministic identity-based public key encryption (D-IBE) in the auxiliaryinput setting. The only known D-IBE scheme (without considering auxiliary inputs) in the standard model was proposed by Bellare et al. in EUROCRYPT'12. However, this scheme is only secure in the selective security setting, and Bellare et al. identified it as an open problem to construct adaptively secure D-IBE schemes. The second contribution of this work is to propose a D-IBE scheme from lattices that is adaptively secure.
Introduction
The fundamental notion of semantic security for public key encryption schemes was introduced by Goldwasser and Micali [16] . While semantic security provides strong privacy guarantees, it inherently requires a randomized encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, randomized encryption only allows linear time search [1, 10] on outsourced databases, which is prohibitive when the databases are terabytes in size. Further, randomized encryption necessarily expand the length of the plaintext, which may be undesirable in some applications such as legacy code or in-place encryption.
Bellare, Bolyreva, and O'Neill [6] initiated the study of deterministic public key encryption schemes that were oriented to search on encrypted data. Clearly, in this setting, no meaningful notion of security can be achieved if the plaintext space is small. Therefore, Bellare et al. [6] required security to hold only when the plaintexts are drawn from a high min-entropic distribution. Very recently, Brakerski and Segev [11] introduced a framework for modeling the security of deterministic encryption schemes with respect to auxiliary inputs. This framework is a generalization of the one formalized by Bellare et al. [6] (and further in [7, 9, 18] ) to the auxiliary-input setting, in which an adversary possibly obtains additional information that is related to encrypted plaintext, and might even fully determine the encrypted plaintext information theoretically. An immediate consequence of having a deterministic encryption algorithm is that no meaningful notion of security can be satisfied if the plaintext can be recovered from the adversary's auxiliary information. Therefore, their framework focuses on the case of hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs. Brakerski and Segev [11] proposed two schemes satisfy this notion of security. However, these two schemes have large public key size, ciphertext size and ciphertext expansion factor. One result of this work is to propose a new scheme from lattices with improved public key size, ciphertext size and ciphertext expansion factor. A deterministic identity-based encryption (D-IBE) scheme is an identity-based encryption [22] scheme with deterministic encryption algorithm. Bellare et al. [8] extended the security definition under high min-entropy into the identity-based setting. D-IBE allows efficiently searchable identitybased encryption of database entries while maintaining the maximal possible privacy, bringing the key-management benefits of the identity-based setting. Bellare et al. proposed a D-IBE scheme by first constructing identity-based lossy trapdoor functions (IB-LTDFs). Due to the inherent limitation of IB-LTDFs, their scheme only achieves selective security, and in fact, it has been identified as an open problem to construct adaptively secure D-IBE schemes [8] .
Our Contributions
In this work, we propose a D-PKE scheme in the auxiliary-input setting from lattices in the standard model. The security of our scheme is based on the hardness of the LWE problem, which is known to be as hard as worst-case lattice problems [21, 19] . The public key size, ciphertext size and ciphertext expansion factor are better than the scheme in [11] , while the private key size is almost the same. The computations involved in encryption of our scheme are matrix-vector multiplication and followed by a rounding step. Matrix-vector multiplication can be implemented very fast in parallel, and rounding operations can also be computed by small low-depth arithmetic circuits. Therefore, the encryption can be implemented very fast. In addition, our scheme is secure even in the multi-user setting (as in [11] ) where related messages may be encrypted under multiple public keys. In this setting we obtain security, with respect to auxiliary inputs, for any polynomial number of messages and users as long as the messages are related by invertible linear transformations.
Furthermore, we extend the security definition in the auxiliary-input setting to D-IBE, and propose a D-IBE scheme in the standard model. The only known (selectively secure) D-IBE scheme (not under the auxiliary-input setting) in the standard model was proposed by Bellare, Kiltz, Peikert and Waters [8] , based on IB-LTDFs.
Our D-IBE scheme is the first adaptively secure one in the auxiliary-input setting. In Appendix A, we also give a more efficient selectively secure D-IBE scheme in the auxiliary-input setting whose ciphertext size and ciphertext expansion factor are comparable to our D-PKE scheme. All our schemes are secure with respect to auxiliary inputs that are sub-exponentially hard to invert.
Overview of Our Approach
A crucial technique hurdle is that the hardness of the LWE problem depends essentially on adding random, independent errors to every output of a mod-q "parity" function. Actually, without any error, parity functions are trivially easy to learn. Fortunately, Banerjee, Peikert and Rosen [5] introduced a "derandomized" LWE problem, i.e., generating the errors efficiently and deterministically, while preserving hardness.
The LWE q,n,m,α assumption says that for any m = poly(n), modulus q and error rate α: The pairs (A, A t s+e), for random matrix A ← Z n×m q , random vector s ← Z n q , and "small" random error terms e ← Z m of magnitude ≈ αq, are indistinguishable from (A, u), where u is uniformly random in Z m q . The derandomization technique for LWE in [5] is very simple: instead of adding a small random error term to the vector A t s ∈ Z m q . They deterministically round it to the nearest element of a sufficiently "coarse" subgroup Z m p where p q. In other words, the "error term" comes solely from deterministically rounding A t s to a relatively nearby value. Denoting the rounding operation as A t s p ∈ Z m p , Banerjee et al. call the problem of distinguishing (A, A t s p ) from uniform random samples the learn with rounding (LWR q,p,n,m ) problem. In [5] , Banerjee et al. show that the LWR q,p,n,m is at least as hard as LWE q,n,m,α for an error rate α proportional to 1/p, and super-polynomial q (q p). In order to make our D-PKE scheme secure in the auxiliary-input setting, it seems that we need more than the pseudorandomness of LWR q,p,n,m with uniformly random secret. We hope the LWR q,p,n,m samples still to be uniformly random even given some auxiliary information of the secret. That is, we want (A, A t s p , f (s)) ≈ (A, u, f (s)) for any hard-to-invert function f . Analogous result of LWE problem was shown in [15] , namely (A, A t s + e, f (s)) ≈ (A, u, f (s)) for properly chosen parameters. We briefly explain this statement. LWE assumption implies that A t can be substituted by
, and E ∈ Z m×n is the error matrix (d is determined by the function f ). Considering the distribution (B, C, E, BCs + Es + e, f (s)). If s is sampled from "small" subgroup in Z n q such as {0, 1} n , Es is "small". For sufficiently "large" e, the distribution of e statistically hides Es. Then we only need to consider the distribution (B, C, E, BCs + e, f (s)). According to the generalized Goldreich-Levin theorem of Dodis et al. in [13] , we know that the distributions of (Cs, f (s)) and (u, f (s)) are statistically close. Applying LWE again, we obtain the above statement.
Randomized IBE schemes from lattices have been proposed in [14, 12, 2, 3, 17] . We adopt some of the techniques in [2] to construct our D-IBE. A non-trivial problem is how to use the artificial abort technique. The artificial abort technique in [2] does not work here, because that method only works on polynomial q. But, to guarantee the security, here we need q to be super-polynomial. We solve this problem by extending the technique first appeared in [23] .
Related Work
Deterministic public key encryption for high min-entropic messages was introduced by Bellare, Boldyreva and O'Neill [6] who formalized a definitional framework, which was later refined and extended in [7, 9, 18] . Bellare et at. [6] presented two constructions in the random oracle model: The first relies on any semantically secure public key encryption scheme; whereas the second relies on the RSA function. Constructions in the standard model were then presented in [7, 9] , based on trapdoor permutations with (almost) uniformly plaintext space [7] , and lossy trapdoor functions [9] . However these constructions fall short in the multi-message setting, where arbitrarily related messages are encrypted under the same public key. O'Neill [18] made a step forwards addressing this problem.
Deterministic public key encryption for auxiliary inputs was proposed by Brakerski and Segev [11] . In the auxiliary-input setting, Brakerski and Segev [11] proposed two constructions in the standard model. The first one is based on d-linear assumptions. This scheme is also secure in the multi-user setting, which solved an open problem in [6] . The second one is based on a rather general class of subgroup indistinguishability assumptions. These two schemes are secure with respect to auxiliary inputs that are sub-exponentially hard to invert.
Deterministic identity-based public key encryption was introduced by Bellare, Kiltz, Peikert and Waters [8] . Bellare et al. aimed to construct identity-based lossy trapdoor functions (IB-LTDFs), which is an extension of lossy trapdoor functions [20] . They built a selectively secure D-IBE as an application of IB-LTDFs. Bellare et al. gave two constructions of IB-LTDFs, while only the one based on Decision Linear Diffie-Hellman assumption can be used to get D-IBE schemes 3 . Since the inherent limitations of IB-LTDFs, it's hard to be directly used to construct adaptively secure D-IBE schemes.
Preliminaries
For an integer m, we denote [m] as an integer set {1, ..., m}. We use bold capital letters to denote matrices, and bold lowercase letters to denote vectors. The notation A t denotes the transpose of the matrix A. When we say a matrix defined over Z q has full rank, we mean that it has full rank modulo q. If A 1 is an n × m matrix and A 2 is an n × m matrix, then [A 1 |A 2 ] denotes the n × (m + m ) matrix formed by concatenating A 1 and A 2 . If x 1 is a vector of length m and x 2 is of length m , then we let [x 1 |x 2 ] denote the length m + m vector formed by concatenating x 1 and x 2 . When doing matrix-vector multiplication, we always view vectors as column vectors.
A function negl(λ) is negligible, if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial in λ. The statistical distance between two distributions X, Y over some finite or countable set S is defined as ∆(X, Y ) = For any integer modulus q ≥ 2, Z q denotes the quotient ring of integer modulo q, and we represent Z q by the numbers {− q−1 2 , ...,
We extend · p component-wise to vectors and matrices over Z q .
Lattices
A full-rank m-dimensional integer lattice Λ ⊆ Z m is a discrete additive subgroup whose linear span is R m . Every lattice is generated as the Z-linear combination of some basis of linearly independent vectors B = {b 1 , ...,
In this work we deal exclusively with "q-ary" lattices. For a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q , define the integer lattice
Let S = {s 1 , ..., s k } be a set of vectors in R m . We use S = { s 1 , ..., s k } to denote the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of the vectors s 1 , ..., s k . We use S to denote the length of the longest vector in S, and S ∞ to denote the largest magnitude of the entries in S . For a real-valued matrix R, we let s 1 (R) denote the largest singular value of R, i.e. s 1 (R)=max u =1 Ru . Let Λ be a discrete subset of Z m . For any vector c ∈ R m and any positive parameter σ ∈ R >0 , let ρ σ,c (x) = exp(−π x − c 2 /σ 2 ) be the Gaussian function on R m with center c and parameter σ. Let ρ σ,c (Λ) = x∈Λ ρ σ,c (x) be the discrete integral of ρ σ,c over Λ, and let D Λ,σ,c be the discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ with center c and parameter σ. Specifically, for all y ∈ Λ, we have
ρσ,c(Λ) . For notional convenience, ρ σ,0 and D Λ,σ,0 are abbreviated as ρ σ and D Λ,σ , respectively.
We recall the learning with errors (LWE) problem, a classic hard problem on lattices defined by Regev [21] . The (decisional) learning with errors problem LWE q,n,m,α , in dimension n with error rate α ∈ (0, 1), stated in matrix form, is: given an input (A, b), where A ∈ Z n×m q for any m=poly(n) is uniformly random and b ∈ Z m q is either of the form b = A t s + e mod q for uniform s ∈ Z n q and e ← D Z m ,αq or is uniformly random (and independent of A), distinguish which is the case, with non-negligible advantage. It is known that when αq ≥ 2 √ n, this decision problem is at least as hard as approximating several problems on n-dimensional lattices in the worst-case to within O(n/α) factors with a quantum computer [21] or on a classical computer for a subset of these problems [19] . In the following, we list some useful facts that make our constructions work.
Lemma 1 ([17] Lemma 2.11)
. Let x ← D Z,r with r > 0, then with overwhelming probability, |x| ≤ r √ n.
Lemma 2 ([4] Lemma 2.1).
Let q, n, m be positive integers with q ≥ 2 be prime, and m ≥ n lg q + ω(lg λ). Let A ← Z n×m q and R ← {−1, 1} m×m . Then (A, AR) is statistically close to uniform.
Lemma 3 ([2] Lemma 15)
. Let R be a k × m matrix chosen at random from {−1, 1} k×m . Then with overwhelming probability,
Lemma 4 ([4] Lemma 3.5).
Let q, n, m be positive integers with q ≥ 2 and m ≥ 6n lg q. There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm TrapGen(q, n, m) that outputs a pair (A, T) ∈ Z n×m q ×Z m×m such that A is statistically close to uniform in Z n×m q and T is a basis for Λ ⊥ (A), satisfying T ∞ ≤ O(n lg q) and T ≤ O( √ n lg q) (Alwen and Peikert assert that the constant hidden in the first O(·) is no more than 20).
There exists an efficient randomized algorithm SampleLeft that, takes as inputs A, B, T A , σ, and outputs a basis S of
There exists an efficient randomized algorithm SampleRight that, takes as inputs A, R, B, T B , σ, and outputs a basis S of Λ ⊥ (U) for U = [A|AR + B] with S ≤ O(σ ·m) whose distribution depends on U, σ. Note that this algorithm still works if we replace B with kB or CB, where k ∈ Z q is coprime with q and C ∈ Z n×n q is fullrank.
We consider any auxiliary input f (x) from which it is hard to recover the input x. We say that a function f is -hard-to-invert with respect to a distribution D, if for every efficient algorithm A it holds that Pr[A(f (x)) = x] ≤ over the choice of x ← D and the internal coin tosses of A. We describe a useful statement as follows which is crucial to our constructions.
Lemma 7 ([15] Theorem 5).
Let k lg t > lg q + ω(lg λ), t = poly(λ). Let D be any distribution over Z n t and f : Z n t → {0, 1} * be any (possibly randomized) function that is 2 −k lg t -hard-to-invert with respect to D. For any super-polynomial q = q(λ), and any m = poly(n), any α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that α/β = negl(λ).
(
where A ← Z n×m q , s ← D ⊆ Z n t and u ← Z m q are uniformly random and e ← D m Z,βq . Assuming the LWE q,d,m,α assumption, where d
For the case of simplicity, we denote the Adv LW E q,n,m,β,f (λ) as the advantage of any efficient distinguisher of the above two distribution in Lemma 7. According to Lemma 7, we know that
Security Definition
In this section, we describe the security notions introduced in [11] . Brakerski and Segev [11] formalized three security notions with respect to auxiliary inputs, and proved that all these three are equivalent. Brakerski and Segev [11] also showed that for the case of blockwise-hard-to-invert (see [11] for a definition of blockwise-hard-to-invert function) auxiliary inputs, encrypting a single message is equivalent to encrypting multiple messages. For the case of simplicity, in this paper, we only consider the case of a single message. In the single message case, hard-to-invert function and the blockwise-hard-to-invert function are equivalent. Furthermore, we slightly extend the notion in [11] . We require the ciphertext is indistinguishable from uniformly random elements in the ciphertext space. This property implies the strong PRIV1-IND notion defined in [11] and recipient anonymity. A deterministic public key encryption scheme consists of three algorithms: (KeyGen, Enc, Dec). The probabilistic KeyGen algorithm produces a secret key and a corresponding public key. The deterministic Enc algorithm uses the public key to map plaintexts into ciphertexts. The deterministic Dec algorithm uses the secret key to recover plaintexts from ciphertexts. Definition 1. A deterministic public key encryption scheme D-PKE=(KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is PRIV1-INDr-secure with respect to -hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs if for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, for any efficiently sampleable distributions M, and any efficiently computable F = {f } that is -hard-to-invert with respect to M such that the advantage of A in the following game is negligible.
Where C is the ciphertext space. The probability is taken over the choices of m ← M, (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(λ), and over the internal coin tosses of A.
The multi-user setting of deterministic public key encryption is a straightforward extension of the above definition. Namely, for any efficient adversary A, given polynomial many encryptions of the related messages under multiple public keys and auxiliary information of these message, can not distinguish them from uniformly random elements in the ciphertext space with the same auxiliary information. A deterministic identity-based public key encryption consists of four algorithms: (IBE.Setup, IBE.KGen, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec). The probabilistic IBE.Setup algorithm generates public parameters, denoted by P P , and a master key M SK. The possibly probabilistic IBE.KGen algorithm uses the master key to extract a private key sk id corresponding to a given identity id. The deterministic IBE.Enc algorithm encrypts messages for a given identity. The deterministic IBE.Dec algorithm decrypts ciphertexts using the private key.
Definition 2. A deterministic identity-based public key encryption scheme D-IBE=(IBE.Setup, IBE.KGen, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec) is PRIV1-ID-INDr-secure with respect to -hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs if for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, for any efficiently sampleable distribution M, and any efficiently computable F = {f } that is -hard-to-invert with respect to M, such that the advantage of A in the following game is negligible.
Where C is the ciphertext space, and oracle IBE.KGen(·) on input id generates a private key sk id for the identity id with the restriction that A is not allowed to query id * . The probability is taken over the choices of m ← M, (P P, M SK) ← IBE.Setup(λ), sk id ← IBE.KGen(P P, id, M SK), and over the internal coin tosses of A.
The D-PKE Scheme
In this section, we propose a deterministic public key encryption scheme in the auxiliary-input setting. Before going to the concrete scheme, we first give a useful lemma, i.e. a trapdoor to invert the rounding function.
Lemma 8. Let p, q, n, m be positive integers with q ≥ p ≥ 2. Let A ∈ Z n×m q be full-rank, and T be a basis of Λ ⊥ (A) with T ∞ < p/m. Given c = A t x p , where x ∈ Z n t with t ≤ q, there is a polynomial-time algorithm Invert(c, A, T) that outputs x. 4 Proof. Given c = A t x p , rewrite it into c = (p/q)A t x + e + pv, where e ∈ R m is an "error" vector with e ∞ ≤ 1/2, and v ∈ Z m . Then compute T t c = (p/q)(AT) t x + T t e + pT t v. Since T is a basis of Λ ⊥ (A), we have T t c = pv + T t e + pT t v = T t e + pw, for some v , w ∈ Z m . Since T t c and pw are integer vectors, then T t e is an integer vector as well. Therefore, T t c = T t e mod p. By the hypothesis of T, we know T t e ∞ ≤ 1/2·m· T ∞ < p/2. Then we get that T t e mod p = T t e, and obtain e, since T is invertible in R. We next compute (q/p)(c − e) = A t x + qv, then, (q/p)(c − e) mod q = A t x. Since A is full-rank modulo q, x can be recovered by Gaussian elimination.
The D-PKE scheme is described as follows. Set the parameters p, q, n, m as specified in Sec. 3.1.
-Key Generation. Algorithm KeyGen(λ) takes as input a security parameter λ. It uses the algorithm from Lemma 4 to generate a (nearly) uniform matrix and a trapdoor, i.e., (A, T) ← TrapGen(q, n, m). It outputs pk = A ∈ Z n×m q and sk = T ∈ Z m×m .
-Encryption. Algorithm Enc(pk, m) takes as input a public key pk = A and a message m ∈ Z n t (⊂ Z n q ). It outputs a ciphertext c = A t m p ∈ Z m p .
-Decryption. Algorithm Dec(sk, c) takes as input a secret key sk = T and a ciphertext c ∈ Z m p . It first computes m ← Invert(c, A, T). Then, if m ∈ Z n t it outputs m, and otherwise it outputs ⊥ .
Correctness and Parameters
For the system to work correctly, we need to ensure that: (1) TrapGen can operate (i.e. m ≥ 6n lg q); (2) Lemma 8 holds; (3) Lemma 7 holds. To satisfy these requirements we set the parameters (q, p, m, n) as follows: n = λ, q = the prime nearest to 2 n δ , m = 6n 1+δ , p = 120n 2+2δ , where δ is constant between 0 and 1. Since A is uniformly random in Z n×m q and m ≥ 6n 1+δ , with overwhelming probability this matrix will have rank n. According to the Lemma 7 and the Theorem 1 which we will give a proof in the next subsection. We obtain that the security of this scheme is based on the LWE q,d,m,α , where d
, and 1/α = 2 n δ (0 < δ < δ). Given the state of art algorithms, this problem is sub-exponentially hard. Furthermore, we can choose k lg t to be sub-linear. Therefore, our auxiliary inputs are sub-exponentially hard to invert.
The public key size, private key size, ciphertext size and ciphertext expansion factor in our scheme are O(n 2+2δ ), O(n 3+3δ ), O(n 1+δ lg n), and O(n δ lg n/ lg t) respectively. To optimize the ciphertext expansion factor, we can choose t = n, which makes the ciphertext expansion factor to be O(n δ ). In [11] , these values are n 2 |G|, n 3 , n|G| and |G| respectively, 5 where |G| denotes the length of elements in group G with order 2 n , It's easy to see that |G| ≥ n.
Security of The D-PKE Scheme
Theorem 1. For any k > (lg q+ω(lg λ))/ lg t, t = poly(λ) ≤ q. The D-PKE scheme is PRIV1-INDrsecure with respect to 2 −k lg t -hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs. If Lemma 7 holds, where 1/β ≥ m · p · n ω(1) , q = n ω(1) , and p = poly(λ).
Proof. For any distribution M over Z n t , let F = {f } be 2 −k lg t -hard-to-invert with respect to distribution M. To prove this theorem, we define a series of games, and give a reduction from the Lemma 7 with respect to distribution M. We do not directly bound the probability of Bad 2 occurring in G 2 , instead deferring it to the analysis of the next game, where we can show that it is indeed negligible. Finally, by the triangle inequality, we have | Pr[X 0 ] − 1/2| ≤ negl(λ) for any efficient adversary A, which completes the proof.
The Multi-User Setting It's easy to extend the above theorem to multi-user setting where linear related messages m 1 , ..., m k are encrypted under any polynomial number of public keys A 1 , ..., A k . Linear related messages mean that there exist invertible and efficiently computable matrices V 2 , .., V k ⊆ Z n×n q and vectors w 2 , ..., w k ∈ Z n q , such that m i = V i m 1 +w i (2 ≤ i ≤ k). In this case, the joint distribution of ciphertexts is ( A t 1 m 1 p , ..., A t k m k p ). I.e., (
Since V i is invertible and A i is uniformly random for 2 ≤ i ≤ k, then A t i V i is uniformly random. Because Lemma 7 holds for any m = poly(n), V i , w i are efficient computable, using the technique in the above proof, we can obtain that our D-PKE scheme is secure in the multi-user for linear related messages. We omit the proof here.
The D-IBE scheme
In this section, we describe our D-IBE scheme. Set the parameters p, q, n, m, σ as specified in Sec. 4.1. We treat an identity id as a non-zero sequence of bits, i.e, id = (b 1 , ..., b ) ∈ {0, 1} \{0 }.
-Setup. Algorithm IBE.Setup(λ) takes as input a security parameter λ. It uses the algorithm from Lemma 4 to generate a pair (A 0 , T) ← TrapGen(q, n, m). Select + 1 uniformly random matrices A 1 , ..., A , B in Z n×m q . It outputs P P = (A 0 , A 1 , ..., A , B) , M SK = T.
-Key Generation. Algorithm IBE.KGen(P P, M SK, id) takes as input public parameters P P , a master secret key M SK, and an identity id ∈ {0, 1} . It first computes
, then it uses the algorithm in Lemma 5 to generate a basis of
-Encryption. Algorithm IBE.Enc(id, m) takes as input public parameters P P , an identity id ∈ {0, 1} , and a message m ← Z n t . It first computes
, then let c = F t id m p . It outputs c.
-Decryption. Algorithm IBE.Dec(P P, id, sk id , c) takes as input public parameters P P , an identity id, a secret key sk id and a ciphertext c ∈ Z 2m p . It first computes m ← Invert(c, F id , sk id ). Then, if m ∈ Z n t it outputs m, and otherwise it outputs ⊥ .
Correctness of Parameters
To ensure the correctness condition, we require: (1) TrapGen can operate (i.e. m ≥ 6n lg q); (2) Lemma 8 holds; (3) Lemma 7 holds; (4) σ is sufficiently large for SampleLeft and SampleRight.
To satisfy all these requirements, we set the parameters (q, p, m, n, σ) as follows: n = λ, q = the prime nearest to 2 n δ , m = 6n 1+δ , σ = 6 n 1.5+δ , p = 3 n 3.5+3δ , where δ is constant between 0 and 1. According to Lemma 7 and Theorem 2 which we will give a proof in the next subsection. We obtain an adaptively secure scheme whose security is based on the LWE q,d,m,α , where d
, and 1/α = 2 n δ (0 < δ < δ). Given the state of art algorithms, this problem is sub-exponentially hard. Furthermore, we can choose k lg t to be sublinear. Therefore, our auxiliary inputs are sub-exponentially hard to invert.
The public key size, private key size, ciphertext size and ciphertext expansion factor in our scheme are O(3( +2)n 2+2δ ), O(n 3+3δ ), O(2n 1+δ lg n), and O(n δ lg n/ lg t) respectively. To optimize the ciphertext expansion factor, we can choose t = n, which makes the ciphertext expansion factor to be O(n δ ).
Remark. We also give a more efficient selectively secure D-IBE, the security definition and the concrete construction are given in Appendix A.
Security of D-IBE.
Theorem 2. For any k > (lg q + ω(lg λ))/ lg t, t = poly(λ), prime integer q = n ω(1) , and p = poly(λ). Assume an adversary A on D-IBE's PRIV1-ID-INDr security with respect to 2 −k lg t -hardto-invert auxiliary inputs, makes at most Q(λ) secret key queries. Then for every polynomial S(λ) and 1/β ≥ m 2 · p · n ω(1) we have
where ∆ = 1 8( +1)Q , and f is any 2 −k lg t -hard-to-invert function. According to Lemma 7 and because S is arbitrary, we obtain: Corollary 1. Let q = n ω(1) be a prime integer, p = poly(λ), 1/β ≥ m 2 ·p·n ω(1) , and α/β = negl(λ). Assuming LWE q,d,m,α assumption with d
, then for any k > (lg q + ω(lg λ))/ lg t, t = poly(λ), the D-IBE scheme is PRIV1-ID-INDr-secure with respect to 2 −k lg t -hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs.
Proof. For any distribution M over Z n t , let F = {f } be 2 −k lg t -hard-to-invert with respect to distribution M. To prove this theorem, we define a series of games, and give a reduction from Lemma 7 with respect to distribution M.
Game G 0 This game is the original PRIV1-ID-INDr game with adversary A. We assume without loss of generality that A always makes exactly Q = Q(λ) secret key queries. We denote these queries by id j for 1 ≤ j ≤ Q, and the challenge identity chosen by A as id * . By X i , we denote the event
Game G 1 In this game, the challenger slightly changes the way to generate the matrices A i , i ∈ [ ] and B. At the setup phase, the challenger first sets an integer M = 4Q, and chooses an integer k uniformly at random in between 0 and . It then chooses a random + 1-length vector, x = (x , x 1 , ..., x ), where x is chosen uniformly at random in {1, ..., M } and x i for i ∈ [ ] are chosen uniformly at random in Z M . We define
And we define a binary function K(id) as
Next it chooses matrices B uniformly at random in Z n×m q , and chooses R i ← {−1, 1} m×m for i ∈ [ ]. The challenger sets B = (q −kM +x )B mod q, and constructs
Since B is uniform, and q is prime, then B is uniform (since −kM + x mod q = 0 for sufficiently large q). By Lemma 4, A 0 is uniform with overwhelming probability, then according to Lemma 2, A i is statistically close to uniform. Therefore, we have | Pr[
Furthermore, F (id) = 0 mod q implies K(id) = 0, since q is super-polynomial, and and M are polynomials, we can assume q M for any reasonable values of q, and M .
Game G 2 In this game, after the adversary has terminated, the challenger throws an event Good 2 independently with probability ∆ = 1 8( +1)Q . The challenger aborts the experiment (and outputs a uniformly random bit) if ¬Good 2 occurs. We get
Game G 3 In this game, the challenger changes the abort policy. We define a function as
Let E denote the event that τ (x, ID Q ) evaluates to 0 for a given choice of x. According to the analysis in [23] (Claim 2), we know that p E = Pr[E] ≥ ∆ = 1 8( +1)Q . Ideally, we would like to replace event Good 2 from game G 2 with event E. Unfortunately, E might not be independent of A's view, so we use artificial abort techniques. That is, given the identities in all ID Q , we approximate p E by sufficiently often sampling values of x. Hoeffding's inequality yields that with λS/∆ samples, we can obtain an approximationp E ≥ ∆ of p E that satisfies Pr[|p E −p E | ≥ ∆/S] ≤ 1/2 λ . Now the challenger finally aborts if E does not occur. But even if E occurs (which might be with probability p E ≥ ∆), the challenger artificially enforces an abort with probability 1 − ∆/p E . We call Good 3 be the event the challenger does not abort. We always have
Hence, except with probability 1/2 λ ,
Since the above inequality holds for arbitrary ID Q except with probability 1/2 λ , we obtain that the statistical distance between the output of game G 2 and G 3 is bounded by ∆/S + 2 −λ . Hence,
Game G 4 In this game, the challenger makes the following conceptual change regarding secret key queries and challenge ciphertext. Namely, upon receiving a secret key query for id ∈ ID Q \id * , the challenger immediately aborts (with uniform output) if K(id) = 0. Upon receiving the challenge identity id * , the challenger immediately aborts (with uniform output) if x + i=1 b * i x i = kM . This change is purely conceptual: since K(id) = 0, for id ∈ ID Q \id * , or x + i=1 b * i x i = kM , event E cannot occur, so the Game G 4 would eventually abort as well. We get Pr[
Game G 5 In this game, the challenger changes the ways to generate A 0 , B and to answer secret key queries. By the change from game G 4 , we may assume that K(id) = 1 for all id ∈ ID Q \id * and x + i=1 b * i x i = kM for id * . This implies that F (id) = 0 mod q for all id ∈ ID Q \id * , and F (id * ) = 0 mod q. The challenger chooses A 0 uniformly at random in Z n×m q and use Lemma 4 to generate B with a trapdoor (B , T B ) ← TrapGen(q, n, m). From Lemma 4 we know that the distribution of A 0 , B are statistically close. Upon receiving a secret query for id, the challenge use the algorithm 
Game G 6 In this game, the challenger changes the way to generate challenge ciphertext. The challenger samples m ← M, and sample error vector e ← D m Z,βq . we denote b = A t 0 m + e mod q. It setsĉ = [b t |b t R * ] t and let c * 0 = ĉ p , c * 1 be as in the game G 5 , i.e. chosen at random in Z 2m p . The challenger returns (c * b , f (m)) to A, but with one exception: we define a "bad event" Bad 6 to be
where B = βq √ nm. If Bad 6 occurs on any ofĉ, the challenger immediately abort the game. Since (R * ) t b = (A 0 R * ) t m + (R * ) t e, and R * = i=1 b * i R i , where R i ∈ {−1, 1} m×m , we have (R * ) t e ∞ ≤ βq √ nm with overwhelming probability, since e ← D m Z,βq according to Lemma 1. If Bad 6 does not occur for someĉ, then we have
It immediately follows that for any adversary A
We do not directly bound the probability of Bad 6 occurring in game G 6 , instead deferring it to the analysis of the next game, where we can show that it is indeed negligible.
Game G 7 In this game the only difference is that challenger chooses b ∈ Z m q uniformly at random, and samples m ← M. To generate the challenge ciphertext, it setsĉ = [b t |b t R * ] t , and let c * 0 = ĉ p . It returns (c * b , f (m)) to A, subject to the same "bad event" Bad 7 and abort condition as described in the game G 6 above. Under Lemma 7 and by the fact "bad event" can be tested efficiently givenĉ, this implies that | Pr[X 7 ] − Pr[X 6 ]| ≤ Adv LWE q,n,m,β,f for any efficient attacker A. For the same reason, it also follows that
Let us consider the pair (b t , b t R * ), where b ∈ Z m q is uniformly random, R * = i=1 b * i R i and R i 's are pairwise independently chosen from {−1, 1} m at random. Since id * = 0 , there exists j, such that b * j = 1. By Lemma 2 (when n = 1), we have that (b t , b t R j ) is statistically close to U (Z 2m q ). Because R i 's are pairwise independent, we obtain that (b t , b t R * ) is statistically close to U (Z 2m q ). This means thatĉ is statistically close to U (Z 2m q ), therefore for each uniformĉ, Pr[Bad 7 ] ≤ 2m(2B + 1)p/q = negl(λ), by assumption on q and β. It follows that
Game G 8 This game is similar to game G 7 , with b ∈ Z 2m q being chosen uniformly at random, m being sampled from M, and Bad 8 being defined similarly. However, in this game the challenger always returns (c * b , f (m)) to A, even when Bad 8 occurs. By the analysis above, we have that for any adversary A, | Pr[
According to the analysis in Game 7 , we knowĉ is uniformly random, up to negligible statistical distance. Since f (m) is independent ofĉ and the statistical distance between U (Z 2m p ) and U (Z 2m q ) p is at most 2mp/q = negl(λ) by assumption on q, so we have Pr[X 8 ] − 1/2 ≤ negl(λ) for any efficient adversary A.
Finally, by the triangle inequality, we obtain the result of Theorem 2.
A The D-sIBE Scheme Definition 3. A deterministic identity-based public key encryption scheme D-IBE=(IBE.Setup, IBE.KGen, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec) is PRIV1-sID-INDr-secure with respect to -hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs if for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, for any efficiently sampleable distribution M, and any efficiently computable F = {f } that is -hard-to-invert with respect to M, such that the advantage of A in the following game is negligible.
In this section, we propose a selectively secure deterministic IBE scheme in the auxiliary setting. Set the parameters p, q, n, m, σ as specified in Sec. A.1. We treat an identity id as an element in Z n q .
-Setup. Algorithm sIBE.Setup(λ) takes as input a security parameter λ. It uses the algorithm from Lemma 4 to generate a pair (A 0 , T) ← TrapGen(q, n, m). Select two uniformly random matrices A 1 , B in Z n×m q , and a full-rank differences (FRD) 7 function H. It outputs P P = (A 0 , A 1 , B, H), M SK = T.
-Key Generation. Algorithm sIBE.KGen(P P, M SK, id) takes as input public parameters P P , a master secret key M SK, and an identity id ∈ Z n q . It first computes F id = [A 0 |A 1 +H(id)B], then it uses the algorithm in Lemma 5 to generate a basis of Λ ⊥ (F id ): T F id ← SampleLeft(A 0 , A 1 + H(id)B, T, σ). It outputs sk id = T F id as a secret key for id.
-Encryption. Algorithm sIBE.Enc(P P, id, m) takes as input public parameters P P , an identity id ∈ Z n q , and a message m ← Z n t . It first computes
Finally it outputs c.
-Decryption. Algorithm sIBE.Dec(P P, id, sk id , c) takes as input public parameter P P , an identity id, a secret key sk id and a ciphertext c ∈ Z 2m p . It first computes m ← Invert(c, F id , sk id ). Then, if m ∈ Z n t it outputs m, and otherwise it outputs ⊥ .
A.1 Correctness and Parameters
For the system to work correctly, we need to ensure that: (1) TrapGen can operate (i.e. m ≥ 6n lg q); (2) Lemma 8 holds; (3) Lemma 7 holds; (4) σ is sufficiently large for SampleLeft and SampleRight.
To satisfy these requirements we set the parameters (q, p, m, n, σ) as follows: n = λ, q = the prime nearest to 2 n δ , m = 6n 1+δ , σ = 6n 1.5+δ , p = 3n 3.5+3δ , 7 I.e., H maps Z n q to Z n×n q
, and for id = id , H(id) − H(id ) is full-rank. where δ is constant between 0 and 1. According to Lemma 7 and Theorem 3 which we will give a proof in Appendix B. We obtain a selectively secure deterministic identity-based encryption scheme whose security is based on the LWE q,d,m,α , where d k lg t−ω(lg λ) lg q
The public key size, private key size, ciphertext size and ciphertext expansion factor in our scheme are O(3n 2+2δ ), O(n 3+3δ ), O(2n 1+δ lg n), and O(n δ lg n/ lg t) respectively. To optimize the ciphertext expansion factor, we can choose t = n, which makes the ciphertext expansion factor to be O(n δ ).
B Security of D-sIBE
Theorem 3. For any k > (lg q + ω(lg λ))/ lg t, t = ploy(λ) ≤ q. The D-sIBE scheme is PRIV1-sID-INDr-secure with respect to 2 −k lg t -hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs. If Lemma 7 holds, where 1/β ≥ m 2 · p · n ω(1) , q = n ω(1) , and p = poly(λ).
Proof. For any distribution M over Z n t , let F = {f } be 2 −k lg t -hard-to-invert with respect to distribution M. To prove this theorem, we define a series of games, and give a reduction from Lemma 7 with respect to distribution M. We do not directly bound the probability of Bad 2 occurring in game G 2 , instead deferring it to the analysis of the next game, where we can show that it is indeed negligible.
Game G 3
In this game the challenger chooses b ∈ Z m q uniformly at random, and samples m ← M. To generate the challenge ciphertext, it setsĉ = [b t |b t R] t . The challenger sets c * 0 = ĉ p and outputs (c * b , f (m)) to A, subject to the same "bad event" Bad 3 and abort condition as described in the game G 2 above. Under Lemma 7 and by the fact "bad event" can be tested efficiently given b, this implies that | Pr[ According to the analysis in Game 3 , we knowĉ is uniformly random, up to negligible statistical distance. Since f (m) is independent ofĉ and the statistical distance between U (Z 2m p ) and U (Z 2m q ) p is at most 2mp/q = negl(λ) by assumption on q, so we have | Pr[X 4 ]−1/2| ≤ negl(λ) for any efficient adversary A.
Finally, by the triangle inequality, we have Adv
